Between 2000 and 2002, we followed 1621 individuals in Delhi, India using a combination of weekly and monthly-recall health questionnaires. In 2008, we augmented these data with another 8 weeks of surveys during which households were experimentally allocated to surveys with different recall periods. We show that the length of the recall period had a large impact on reported morbidity, doctor's visits, time spent sick, and the reported use of self-medication. The effects are more pronounced among the poor than the rich. In one particularly dramatic example, differential recall effects across income groups reverse the sign of the gradient between doctor visits and per-capita expenditures such that the poor use health care providers more than the rich in the weekly recall surveys but less in monthly recall surveys. We hypothesize that illnesses--especially among the poor--are no longer perceived as "extraordinary events" but have become part of -normal‖ life. We discuss the implications of these results for health survey methodology, the mystery of the -sicker rich,‖ and the economic interpretation of sickness in poor populations.
Introduction
How much does survey design affect survey results and, therefore, our view of the world? Why is it that the rich report more illnesses than the poor in a large number of surveys? These questions seem largely unrelated but are at the core of this paper. Using the length of the recall period as a lens through which to examine these issues, we show that the number used to fill the blank in the standard screening question, -Were you sick in the last ___ weeks?‖ makes an enormous difference to the results. We compare weekly and monthly recall periods using observational and experimental data and find that not only do different recall periods give very different results, but also that these differences are not uniform across income groups. Both reported illnesses and reported use of health care are lower in monthly reports, with the declines an order of magnitude higher for the poor than for the rich. In one case, the difference across income groups is so dramatic that the sign of the gradient between doctor visits and per-capital expenditures (PCE) reverses depending on the recall period-in weekly recall surveys, the poor visit doctors far more than the rich.
This study stems from a long-term project in Delhi examining morbidity and health-seeking behavior among 300 urban households. 2 At the beginning of the project, in 2000, we noted that the patterns of morbidity and health care-seeking behavior observed in the field among the richer households accorded well with theoretical and cognitive models frequently used in the health economics literature. The (relatively) wealthy became sick, self-medicated as a first resort, and then, sought out treatment from a doctor. For example: -I fell sick on Monday with a very bad cold; I took aspirin until
Wednesday and then, when I was still not better by Friday, I went to the doctor. The doctor gave me antibiotics, which I took until Wednesday, and now I am fine.‖
Yet, among households in poor localities and slums, the underlying models of disease and treatmentseeking seem to be fundamentally different. People appear to be sick all the time and going to a doctor seems less like an -exceptional‖ event than a common fact of life, well-integrated into a household's daily routine. Interview narratives about major illnesses are fractured and temporally non-linear. 3 The chaos inherent in preliminary interviews with poor households, including numerous doctor visits, complete uncertainty about when the disease was diagnosed, whether it was -cured,‖ and uncertainty about current health status-is very different from what standard health surveys lead us to believe. The health rounds of India's National Sample Survey, for instance, allow for a fairly well-developed narrative in which people fall sick with a variety of illnesses and pay high prices for -catastrophic‖ incidents that often put them in debt. That an individual's health status constantly fluctuated between illness and well-being and that he or she visited different doctors numerous times, incurring potentially large expenditures for seemingly -minor‖ illnesses, never emerged as a dominant theme.
In an attempt to capture some of the patterns we observed in the field, we designed and implemented a weekly survey module that was eventually interspersed with monthly-recall modules over a 2-year survey period from 2000 to 2002. 4 Given surprisingly large recall effects in the observational data, we returned to the field in 2008 to experimentally evaluate these effects in a subsample of households over a 2-month period.
We find that responses differ quite dramatically depending on the length of the recall period and are consistent across the observational and experimental data. While both the rich and poor underreport acute health events in monthly-recall surveys, the level of underreporting is strongly correlated with PCE. The poor underreport more and this underreporting seems to arise from the -forgetting‖ of entire episodes of acute illness. Among the poor, monthly reporting -erases‖ almost half the morbidity burden of acute illnesses, over a third of doctor visits for both acute and chronic illnesses, and almost half of all self-medication episodes. We explore the possibility that this -forgetting‖ is driven by a process of normalization of sickness. Consistent with this hypothesis, we are able to show that recall effects are larger for those individuals and households whose initial sickness burden is also higher; arguably, these are households where sickness has become a -normal‖ event.
Although we are able to present stark results on morbidity and doctor visits, we should note that we are unable to integrate routine and catastrophic bouts of illness into our results and therefore, provide a full accounting of health expenditures and the impact of different recall periods on health spending. Our results do not apply to episodes of illness associated with very large expenditures.
Consistent with results from Banerjee and others (2006) , there does not appear to be systematic recall bias on the amount of total expenditures people incur in a given time period. Somewhat intuitively, child, believing that it would transmit TB to her newborn. But this fact only emerges because the interviewer asks at some stage how the child is now doing. 4 Weekly and monthly recall periods were interspersed to avoid surveyor (and respondent) fatigue and to manage the project within the grant amount.
everyone remembers large expenditures well. 5 We believe that it would take a very large survey or some other sampling technique to get at the frequency of spending on catastrophic illnesses. Since catastrophic illnesses account for a large fraction of total health expenditures, our results on the impact of recall periods on health expenditures remain somewhat tenuous. 6 Nevertheless, the results on reported morbidity and the use of doctors are sufficiently startling that they call into question fundamental assumptions about the health-seeking behavior of poor urban households. Standard theories about inequality in health access or the links between health expenditures and per-capita expenditures are consistent with our monthly recall data but harder to reconcile with observed patterns once the recall period is shortened to a week. A couple of examples are especially noteworthy.
In the health inequality literature, researchers have suggested that inequality in access explains the difference in the number of doctor's visits between the rich and the poor (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000) . Clearly, this hypothesis makes sense in our monthly recall data where the poor visit doctors less than the rich, but it is not consistent with the patterns observed in the weekly data where the poor visit doctors more than the rich. It is possible to reconcile the results with inequality in access once the quality of health care is accounted for, but what a measure of health inequality that accounts for quality may look like (and what measurements are required to construct it) is an open question.
In a similar vein, consider the mystery of the -sicker rich.‖ One long-standing question in the literature on health in developing countries is why the rich appear to be -sicker,‖ as assessed by selfreports, than the poor. This effect has been attributed to various possible explanations. One is that people have different -thresholds‖ or intolerance to discomfort and that these thresholds decrease with income Frankenberg, 2002 or Paqueo and Gonzalez, 2003) . Therefore, a richer person will notice and report more things out of the ordinary than will a poorer person who thinks 5 In India, a -large‖ expenditure is different from the world standard for large expenditures. Nonetheless, such expenditures might still be quite significant to India's poor. We cut off -large‖ expenditures at a level of about $25 US -just about the co-payment for a doctor's visit in the US. In richer countries, unlike in India, everyone may avail themselves of life-saving but very expensive procedures -the decision usually does not lie with the patient but with doctors. In India, where the vast majority of the population does not have health insurance, life and death decisions are made more frequently by the patients and, due to the out of pocket costs involved, patients frequently don't avail themselves of treatments. So, a full accounting of the cost of the health care system has more endogenous (from the patient's perspective) elements in it than would be the case in richer countries. 6 Until recently, medical insurance for catastrophic events was limited to a small fraction of the population. Some estimates suggest that 10 percent of the urban population has access to health insurance; most of these are richer households or government employees. India recently launched a health insurance program for the poor, which is in its 2 nd year in Delhi. Due to various problems in the administration, Delhi reported the lowest enrollments among the Indian states. Therefore, the majority of the poor in the state remain without formal insurance. of some conditions as normal and not as health problems at all. Thomas and Frankenberg's (2002) comparison of self-reported height to measured height demonstrates dramatically the problem with self-reported health status; see Strauss and Thomas (1998) for an overview of the difficulties of selfreported health status measures. Similarly, for the same -objective‖ symptom, a richer person is more likely to complain.
Another hypothesis in the literature is that rich people are more likely to have accurate information concerning chronic conditions. 7 Richer people may respond -yes‖ to the question of whether they've been ill if they have been diagnosed with a chronic illness like diabetes. A poorer person will not know to report the underlying chronic condition unless there has been an acute episode of the ailment in the recall period. Thus, a symptom associated with diabetes may go unrecorded unless the respondent experienced neuropathy or vision problems during the recall period. Similarly high blood pressure would only be recorded if there were severe headaches, and often there are no symptoms at all in a particular recall period. This correlation between reported health and information extends beyond chronic illnesses-for instance, Dow and others (2008) show in an experimental context that increasing the price of health care leads to a drop in physician visits but an improvement in reported health status. They interpret this result as consistent with a positive correlation between information about health and the probability of reporting sick. In the Delhi sample, we examined this possibility and also find substantial evidence of a link between information and the reporting of chronic illnesses (Das and Hammer, 2009) .
In this paper, we suggest a third explanation for the perceived rich-poor health gap. Survey design may drive some of the results relating self-reported illness and income. Since the degree of the effect of the recall period varies dramatically with PCE, it influences estimates of the income elasticity of doctor visits, use of medicines, number of illnesses, and amount spent on health care. We cannot decompose the differential reporting of rich and poor into shares contributed by the competing hypotheses, but we do offer evidence of the substantial role played by recall effects.
The relative frequency of visits to medical providers in our data by both the rich and the poor also requires us to reconsider some commonly prescribed solutions to the health care problem in poor countries. Since the Alma Ata declaration in 1978, policymakers have assumed that they should focus on providing poor people with better -access‖ to primary medical care. 8 Because the main obstacles to access are the price of care and distance, the obvious solution was to open more facilities close to poor people and heavily subsidize (or, preferably, make free) primary care. Our results show that, when carefully measured, the use of health care providers by the very poor was higher than that of the somewhat better-off. Furthermore, the out-of-pocket expenditures of the very poor correspond to the higher-than-previously-thought use of health services. Again, when measured properly, the degree to which very poor people choose to spend on health rises accordingly. Yet, the health of the poor in Delhi-as measured through outcomes data in the National Family Health Survey or the health rounds of the National Sample Survey-is much worse than that of the rich. If the use of health care providers and the extent of health spending do not decrease gaps in health outcomes between the poor and the rich, what is the missing link?
Poor health outcomes may be driven by lack of knowledge, particularly about appropriate preventive measures, the inability of the poor to distinguish between bad and good quality health care, or poor diagnosis of underlying conditions. 9 Simple health care access is not the root of the problem. Thus, instead of focusing on impractical stop-gap policies, like sending doctors to remote areas, which often results in high absenteeism, policymakers must craft solutions that take into account both human behavior and a region's specific health infrastructure. 10 The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data. Section 2 presents the evidence of the overall recall effect independent of its interaction with income. Section 3 explores the data further in order to illustrate the differentials across income groups.
Section I: Data
This paper uses data from two sources. The first is a long-standing panel study of health seeking behavior carried out by the Institute for Socio-Economic Research on Democracy and Development (ISERDD) in Delhi. The study followed 1621 individuals in 300 households from 7 different neighborhoods in Delhi between 2000 and 2002. The localities were chosen through initial contacts developed by the anthropologists on the team. Following these initial contacts, which were used for -entry‖ into the locality, households within each locality were chosen randomly. In each locality, a street was chosen at random and every fourth household located on the street was asked to participate in the survey. A total of 40-45 households were approached to be part of the survey in each locality, and refusal rates were less than 4 percent in all localities. 9 Jalan and Somnathan (2008) , Das and Hammer (2009) 10 Chaudhury and others (2006) The survey methodology incorporates two innovations. First, varying recall periods were used through two years of the survey. The 7 localities were divided into two -waves‖ composed of 4 and 3 localities respectively. Between August 2000 and December 2000, every household in Wave 1 (4 localities) was visited weekly by a member of the ISERDD team and asked about health problems during the previous week, whether treatment was pursued, and how much treatment (if any) cost.
Care was taken to ensure visits to the households were always on the same day of the week, which became the focal reference-point for the weekly recall questions. This design was followed to avoid the possibility of -telescoping‖ (the reporting of events prior to the recall period) in the weekly surveys; it also had costs in terms of missing household observations in the weekly data, which are addressed below. These repeated visits followed a larger initial interview that covered a much wider range of household level information that was not likely to change much during the study periodhousehold structure, total expenditures (using the standard -thin round‖ set of questions for household income and expenditures from the National Sample Survey, which is India's representative household survey), education, and other household characteristics. Second, in both weekly and monthly surveys, information was collected separately on chronic and non-chronic conditions. Chronic conditions were identified through initial interviews, and these illnesses were individually followed up upon each week/month. In the case of chronic illnesses, once identified, individuals would be recorded as sick (with a chronic illness) in every survey (weekly or monthly) and asked about his or her chronic condition during each subsequent visit. Consequently, recall periods, by design, have no effect on the reporting of chronic illnesses or their duration.
Therefore, we examine the effects of recall only on doctor visits and self-medication for chronic conditions. Additionally, a general question (''Were you sick last week/month?'') was used to screen for acute illnesses, and conditional on a positive response, questions were asked about the duration of the morbidity and the resulting treatment, including visits to doctors and self-medication.
Attrition of the sample was negligible due to the diligence of the ISERDD team-the survey lost 5 households over 2 years due to migration out of sample localities. Therefore, we have a large number of observations across time asking the same set of participants the same survey questions with varying recall periods (though, of course, with fewer observations for monthly rather than weekly recall periods). These data will be used to compare responses given for weekly versus monthly recall periods. The size of the discrepancies between survey responses in the weekly and monthly data indicates the magnitude of forgetting that takes place with the monthly recall period. Given the structure of the data, we will also be able to account for seasonal effects by including responses from the group of households administered a monthly survey concurrently. Finally, since monthly surveys were administered after the completion of weekly surveys, we are able to avoid -telescoping‖ effects (survey reports capture events preceding the recall period considered) in the monthly data as well.
Our second data source is an experiment carried out in 2008 to verify the large recall effects discovered in the observational data. For this survey, we began with a sub-sample of 205 households and surveyed them for a total of 2 months. In the first month, the entire sub-sample was interviewed using the weekly-recall module. In the second month, the sub-sample was split into two randomly assigned groups. The -treatment‖ group continued with weekly recall surveys for another 4 weeks, while the -control‖ group was administered a single survey collecting data on the basis of monthly recall at the end of the month. The randomization was privately completed using STATA and was stratified by locality. To check the randomization, we compared household characteristics for the control and treatment groups and found that the two sets of households are similar on all observable criteria.
The two data sources are complementary. In the -observational‖ data -that is, the data from families that were tracked for two years -many individual characteristics are held constant over time, including general healthiness and innate ability to recall events. However, a drawback to using this type of data arises from its vulnerability to temporal autocorrelation of illness patterns that differ between individuals and could systematically influence individuals' recollections of events. This temporal autocorrelation would be particularly problematic if the localities in the two different waves differed in their morbidity and treatment seeking patterns. In our analysis, we attempt to tackle this problem by including individual fixed effects and a full set of monthly dummies. Nonetheless, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that our results are biased by this autocorrelation.
In the -experimental‖ data, the autocorrelation of illnesses is entirely controlled for by the randomization process. On the other hand, the experimental sample is not large enough to produce precise heterogeneous treatment effects. In particular, for the observational data, there are a minimum of 36 weekly observations and 5 monthly observations for 300 households, while in the experimental data the sample size is reduced to 4 weekly observations and 1 monthly observation for 205 households. Therefore, we use the experimental data to verify the average treatment effects from the observational estimates, but we rely on the observational data to further examine heterogeneity in the treatment, particularly across income groups.
Summary statistics for all individuals and households in the observational sample are presented in Tables 1.A and 1.B. Individuals in our sample tend to be young (with a median age of 22), poorly educated (50% of all individuals are either illiterate or have less than primary education), and living in nuclear households with an average of 5.4 members per household. About 50% of respondents of age greater than 15 are employed, resulting in 1.5 income earners per household, although only a third of income earners are employed in the formal sector (public and private). Table 1 .A also presents summary statistics by income group. Per capita income among rich households is more than three times that among poor households (see Table 1 .B). Since both household size and the number of employed adults per household are similar across income groups, variation in income levels is mainly due to differences in the earning capacity of employed adults. As expected, average age and education are higher for the rich, who also enjoy better access to infrastructure facilities and sanitation systems such as flush toilets and piped water. Employment rates are not substantially different across income groups, but the composition of employment does vary with a higher incidence of public sector employment among the middle and upper income groups.
As a check on the external validity of our results, Das and Sánchez (2002) compared the ISERDD sample to two representative samples from Delhi-the (Delhi) National Family Health (1993) and National Sample Survey (2000) . Their comparison suggests that the ISERDD sample is, on average, slightly younger (with a one year difference in the mean age) with a greater density of households in the upper income groups. These differences do not appear to be large, and assuming a positive relationship between income and health, should actually bias our results towards less morbidity than what is representative for Delhi as a whole.
Appendix Table 1 compares the main outcome variables for the sub-sample of 205 households in the experimental survey to the original sample of 300 households. The means are computed for the first wave of weekly surveys completed in 2000-01. The number of -acute‖ illnesses refers to the total number of acute illnesses reported in the preceding month, and weekly reports are aggregated up to obtain monthly totals. Since aggregated measures could overstate the recall effect if episodes last longer than a week, we will also examine two other outcome measures-whether or not at least one acute illness was reported and the duration of acute illness-that should not be affected by this aggregation bias. For our full sample, based on the weekly data, individuals report just less than 1 acute episode a month, and about 47 percent report at least one episode. The average time spent sick every month is 4 days. Whether or not treatment was sought is measured through doctor visits and self-medication. On average, people visit 0.4 doctors a month (roughly 1 doctor's visit every 10 weeks) and the majority of visits are for acute illnesses. Individuals also self-medicate, and around 30 percent self-medicated at least once in an average month of the survey.
Finally, there appear to be few differences in the initial year of the survey between the larger observational sample and the experimental sub-sample of 205 households, although there is some evidence that more time is spent sick with acute illnesses with higher reported durations in the experimental sub-sample. In addition, the sub-sample households were somewhat more likely to selfmedicate during the experimental survey than the 300 households in the original observational survey. These results are reassuring both because of external validity concerns from the experiment. Table 2 shows the differences in means for the main outcome variables between the weekly and monthly recall for the observational and experimental samples. It provides a benchmark from which progressively more detailed specifications deal with, in Tables 3 through 5, respectively: 1) time invariant individual fixed-effects and seasonal effects in a difference in differences specification, 2) variation in recall effects by total number of episodes, and 3) possible biases introduced by modeling alternative patterns of missing values that are more frequent in weekly than monthly data. 11
Section II: Recall period and health measures
As is clear from the table, the response from the monthly-recall group is lower than that of the weekly-recall group for every outcome variable. Furthermore, with only the exception of time spent sick with an acute illness, the estimated differences between the experimental and observational results are virtually identical and statistically similar. The tests between the weekly and monthly data are precisely estimated, and the differences between the methods are robust. For time spent suffering from an acute illness, both methods show that the results from monthly recall are significantly different from those from weekly recall, just at slightly different rates. 12 On every dimension, the declines due to monthly reporting are large and important behaviorally. The number of acute illnesses declines by 0.6 illnesses per person-month or just over 60 percent. This measure may be contaminated if episodes last longer than a week (and are thus double-counted in the weekly but not the monthly data). However, consistent with the total acute illness result, we find that the probability of reporting any acute illness also declines by close to 15 percentage points in the monthly-recall surveys. Given base probabilities in the weekly-recall surveys of 47 (45) percent in the observational (experimental) data, this suggests that close to a third of all acute episodes are -forgotten‖ once the recall period is increased to a month. Similarly, the total number of doctor visits declines by 0.16 (observational) and 0.18 (experimental) visits per month or 37 percent of the base weekly probabilities. As is clear from decomposition of doctor visits into doctor's visits for acute and chronic illnesses, the majority of these declines are in doctor visits for acute illnesses, which also account for the bulk of visits. Finally, there are large reported declines in the use of self-medication, both measured as the frequency of any self-medication and the total number of medications taken. Table 2 also shows how recall effects alter our perception of average household morbidity and treatment-seeking patterns. In the weekly data, households (outcome variables are aggregated up to the household level by summing across individuals) report a total of 5 acute illnesses a month. On average, 2.4 individuals in every household report at least one acute illness in a month, and household members spend a total of between 23 and 26 days sick per month. There are between 2 (observational) and 3 (experimental) doctor visits every month, the bulk of which are accounted for by acute illnesses-a result very much in line with our own experiences during the initial field work. 12 In combination with Appendix Table 1, the means also present a counterpoint to the results in Kremer and others (2009) , in which repeated surveying lead to behavioral changes in households, which in turn led to a decline in diarrheal diseases. Our results show that the means of the outcome variables are very similar in the experimental sample of 205 households observed in 2000 and in 2008. This suggests that, despite the many surveys that households participated in, there was no change in overall morbidity or the probability of seeking treatment. This could be because our survey covered a number of different topics and did not ask respondents about specific behavioral actions.
In Table 3 , we account for time-invariant individual heterogeneity and seasonality in the observational and experimental data. Specifically, for the observational data, we estimate where the additional lag is introduced to increase the efficiency of the recall estimate. Given the nature of the experiment, yi,t-1 is necessarily uncorrelated with Tit.
The estimates from these specifications are presented in Table 3 for both households and individuals.
To account for intra-cluster correlations in the error structure, we cluster standard errors at the household/locality level depending on the unit of observation. The results from the simple means comparisons are largely replicated with some differences. Most notably, the estimated recall estimates are somewhat lower in the experimental data for the number of individuals reporting at least one acute illness during the month, and the effect on doctor visits declines from 18.3 percentage points to 8.7 percentage points. This decline happens primarily because respondents experienced unusually few health events in the second month of the data. It is likely that a longer experimental study would have yielded similar results as those using the observational estimates. The household level estimates for both the observational and experimental estimates are again similar to the means comparisons.
Again, the estimated effect of recall on doctor visits in the experimental case is lower due to the inclusion of seasonal effects. In the experimental case, the significance is also lower due to the smaller sample size. To check whether this recall effect is driven by high morbidity and differential recall for sickness among children, we restricted the sample to those above the age of 15 and find no difference in the estimated parameters. The estimates in the observational data for number of acute illnesses, the probability of a single acute illness and doctor visits are respectively 0.55 (0.57), 0.13 (0.12) and 0.13 (0.14) in the full and adult-only samples, the latter in parenthesis. Table 4 explores whether -forgetting‖ is higher among individuals and households with larger health burdens. Here, we include an additional interaction of the recall effect with the original morbidity burden in the first year of recall surveys. While, for the experimental data, these effects retain their causal interpretation, temporal autocorrelation in the observational data limits our ability to move beyond correlations without imposing further assumptions on the nature of the lag structure. The experimental data strongly suggests that the recall effects are stronger among those with a higher initial burden. These effects are significant for the total number of acute illnesses and the use of selfmedication. They are also reasonably large for doctor's visits, but again, the small sample leads to imprecision in the estimated coefficients. In the observational data, the effects are uniformly large and significant and are actually quite close to the experimental estimates. The large size of the coefficients suggests that some portion of the recall effect is driven by those individuals and households with large morbidity burdens. In the observational results, the effect of recall on doctor's visits disappears entirely with the inclusion of the lagged morbidity interaction term, suggesting that when individuals and households have a large number of doctor's visits, they start to systematically forget entire episodes and it is precisely these households that drive the large observed differences between monthly and weekly reporting. This is consistent with our hypothesis that, in poor settings, individuals have come to treat sickness and doctor's visits as a regular part of their daily lives rather than an extraordinary event.
Figure 1 illustrates this effect in the observational data. The figure plots the number of acute illnesses reported in the second period of data collection on acute illnesses as reported weekly in the first period. The second period data is divided into weekly and monthly recall period. These results are consistent with all of our previous results. First, it is clearly the case that weekly recall is much higher than monthly. Second, the higher the number of illnesses in the initial year, the higher the number of illnesses and the larger the gap between monthly and weekly reports is in the next period.
Interpreting this gap as -forgetting,‖ the results suggest that forgetting occurs in strict proportionality with the number of health episodes, a result that even extends into the unreliable area of the data where observations are sparse.
Finally, Table 5 presents a robustness check on our results to account for missing observations.
Specifically, in the weekly survey, surveyors were instructed to visit every household on the same day every week to ensure that the reference period was benchmarked to the previous visit. One of the repercussions of this rigid survey schedule was that 15 percent of our weekly observations were missing. In around half of these cases, the observation is missing because the surveyor did not visit the household due to a national holiday and in the remaining half, it is missing because the house was locked or the respondent could not be found despite repeated visits during the day. These missing variables create a particular problem when we aggregate weekly reports into monthly data since in the monthly recall surveys, a week outside the house would not result in a missing observation. In our previous regression specifications, we took the extreme position that the missing variables correspond to a fully healthy report for the individual in the missing week-this ensured that we computed a lower bound for the recall effect. In Table 5 , we present estimates from two alternate assumptions-that the data were -missing at random‖ (which is certainly true for national holidays when surveyors did not visit the household) or that the missing data corresponded to a report of sickness with an associated doctor's visit. The estimates from these two alternate specifications are presented as the -Missing at Random‖ (MAR) rows and the -Upper Bound‖ (UB) rows. The -Lower Bound‖ (LB) rows replicate the estimates from previous regressions for comparability. As seen in the table, the MAR estimates are somewhat higher but fairly close to the LB estimates, while the UB estimates are an order of magnitude higher. The true recall effects are likely somewhere between the MAR and UB estimates, and probably close to the MAR. This is because the simultaneous interviews by anthropologists on the team suggest that, in some cases, households would return to their villages in order to better cope with severe illness. If this is the case, absence may be correlated with illness, leading MAR to underestimate the true recall effect.
Section III: Variation in bias by income
It is possible that these differences in weekly versus monthly data are not a terrible problem. If the underestimation of the frequency of illness and the use of health services were orthogonal to variables that researchers are interested in using to explain these phenomena, then the overall explanatory power of models using monthly data would be lower than with weekly and there would be bias in the scale of all coefficients uniformly -all effects would be about half of their real effect.
Relative impacts of different variables would still be recoverable. However, in this section, we use the observational data to show that this recall effect is dramatically related to, arguably, the most important possible determinant of health care demand -household income. In this case, mismeasurement of the dependent variable biases gradients like the income elasticity of doctor visits, and therefore, fundamentally affects our understanding of how illnesses are reported and how individuals seek treatment.
Specifically, we can decompose the income elasticity of expenditures on health, commonly believed to be quite high, into three parts -the probability of being ill, the probability of seeking treatment conditional on being ill, and the price of services sought. We present four figures that explore each of these components in turn. Figure 2 shows the number of family members who reported at least one acute illness in any one month when asked on a weekly versus a monthly basis as a function of the family's log per capita expenditure. 13 In this and other figures, the vertical line represents the income range beyond which the data is very sparse and therefore, less reliable. There is an obvious difference between the recall periods; the outcome variables measured with weekly recall are always significantly larger than those measured with monthly recall. The slope of the weekly recall curve is very steep, and for the highest income values, approaches the monthly recall curve. While more than two episodes of illness are forgotten per month by the poorest, the wealthiest forget less than half an episode per month on average. When measured using monthly data, the difference between the rich and the poor is slightly less than one acute episode per family per month. The apparent recall effect alone goes a long way in explaining why the poor are less sick than the rich in most self-reported data. In fact, the poor are sicker, a conclusion that is clear in this high frequency data.
Similarly, and possibly more importantly from the policy perspective, this pattern is evident in the number of visits to medical practitioners. 14 Our results, presented in Figure 3 , help explain several puzzling results in health care economics. First, surveys commonly show that doctor's visits are positively correlated with income. In Figure 3 , this pattern does, in fact, emerge but with some interesting nuances. In the monthly data -the most common recall period in use -there is a clear increase in doctor visits in the lower half of the sample, which plateaus in the middle of the sample.
There may be a further increase at the top of the income spectrum, but this is an area with fewer observations. Except for the leveling off -which, unless a demand function had a careful, non-linear, specification of income effects, rather than the standard log-log specification, the regression would miss -our monthly results are similar to standard results. 13 Chronic illnesses are excluded here because the survey methodology guarantees that the chronically ill are recorded as sick (with a chronic illness) once diagnosed regardless of the recall period used. To create monthly measures of reported doctor's visits and total expenditures from weekly data, we can just sum the visits and expenditures. Creating a monthly measure of health events is somewhat more difficult. For example, an event with duration greater than a week would be reported in multiple surveys in the weekly recall group but only in one survey in the monthly recall group, leading us to overestimate the total number of health events per month using the weekly data. As a result, we also variously use the total duration of health events in a month or condition on having at least one health event in a given month to ensure that the results on recall and morbidity are not driven by potential -double-counting‖. 14 The term -doctors‖ has to be interpreted carefully here since the range of providers of medical services is very wide in India -from MD's and MBBS (standard medical university training) doctors to people knowledgeable of Indian traditional medicine (but prescribe allopathic medicine anyway) to genuine -quacks‖ with no training whatsoever (Das and Hammer, 2005) .
However, when we turn to the weekly data, an entirely different story emerges. There may be a tiny increase of doctor visits with income at the lowest level of income, though this is neither noticeably nor significantly different from a flat line. Much more prominent is the dramatic decline of doctor visits throughout the reliable range of the data. Again, the number of doctor's visits may increase at the very top of the income spectrum, but the data is too sparse to tell. The decline in doctor's visits as a function of income, when measured in weekly surveys as opposed to the increase when measured monthly, raises suspicions about the conventional wisdom dictating that richer people visit medical practitioners more frequently. and an income proxy is in line with the literature, which typically reports income elasticity above one.
In fact, for the lower half of the sample, the implied income elasticity is well above one; the concavity noticeable in the non-parametric regression moderates the overall effect. For the weekly recorded expenditures, the story is entirely different, with poorer people spending less than others -the slope increases slightly -but by less than a factor of one and by only a half for the most reliable portion of the data. So, contrary to much of the theoretical and empirical literature, controlling for recall bias, it appears that healthcare is a normal but not a luxury good. Table 6 repeats the basic regressions from Section 2 to show that the response heterogeneity by income visible in the figures is, indeed, born out statistically. In these analyses, we restrict ourselves to the observational data and augment the estimating equation with the inclusion of household PCE and household PCE interacted with recall period. The estimates largely confirm the results from the figures in the observational data. For all our outcome variables, the recall effect is greater for the poor than for the rich. These effects are uniformly significant and suggest, for instance, that at the household level, an increase in (log) PCE by 1 increases the size of the recall effect by close to 0.4 doctor visits per month. The duration estimates at the household level are particularly large. Since log PCE varies between 7 and 10 in our sample, our estimate suggests that monthly surveys may underestimate the total time spent sick by members of a household by as much as 12 days a month.
We present, then, another possible explanation for the puzzling positive relationship between selfreported ailments and income observed in most household studies. Several authors suggest that rich people have higher self-reported morbidity than poor people because they have less tolerance for discomfort than poor people do. As we have shown in this paper, it is possible that the results that motivate such an interpretation are not as strong as generally thought. When measured using weekly data, there is a large difference between rich and poor individuals' reported health events in the expected direction, and we find that poor people visit doctors more often than richer people do, though they spend less per visit. These results complement our findings for chronic illnesses and information (Das and Hammer 2009) . Because the rich are far more likely to be diagnosed with a chronic illness, were known chronic illnesses included in the definition of sickness, we would reproduce the well known and puzzling positive correlation between sickness and income; this gradient would be higher in the monthly than in the weekly surveys. Thus, while differential sensitivity to severity across income groups is an important factor in self-reports, recall bias, awareness of chronic illness and the interaction between the two adds another set of considerations to explain the puzzling empirical regularity of the -sicker rich.‖
Conclusion
Common sources of information concerning health conditions-the National Sample Surveys in India and the Living Standards Measurement Surveys of the World Bank-use between 2 weeks and a month as a standard recall period for illnesses. Ordinarily, we assume that decisions about recall length don't bias results. In this paper, we find that this assumption can be quite wrong and can lead to seriously misleading perceptions about health burden and human behavior.
We find that, with more precise measures, our notions about the nature and frequency of illness among the urban poor in India are quite different than results found with cruder measures. Choice of recall period has distinct substantive implications. Poor people are ill for large fractions of the year with ailments that are short-term and, apparently, easily forgotten. Richer people, who do not forget as easily, do not suffer from acute illnesses nearly as much as the poor. This directly contradicts much of what is believed about the relative impact of income on self-reported illness.
Our results suggesting that the poor are more ill and utilize health providers more than the rich have several important implications. At a methodological level, these results call into question existing measures of health inequality that do not account for quality of health care. Taken at face value, the data from Delhi support better health care access for the poor relative to the rich if health care access is measured as provider utilization. At the policy level, simple access to a health facility is not a problem as has been assumed in the standard literature for years. We must therefore focus on quality of care, on the different nature of diseases that people of different income groups face, and on what degree of market failure public expenditure in health can overcome. But we know that merely increasing -access‖ is not the answer. the 10%; **significant at the 5%; *** significant at 1% At least one acute was reported: This variable equals 1 if the individual reported at least one acute illness in the month, and is zero otherwise. Duration of acute illnesses: Total number of days with acute illnesses in the month. For monthly data this is equal to the maximum value between duration of the first acute and the second one. At least one self medication was taken: This variable equals 1 if the individual reported have taken at least one medicine by him/her self, and is zero otherwise. Note: Columns 1-4 contain means with standard deviations in parentheses. Columns 5 and 6 contain mean difference between monthly and weekly data, and parentheses contain standard errors. (0.210) * Significant at the 10%; **significant at the 5%; *** significant at 1%. Weekly: This variable equals 1 if the data were collected weekly, and is zero otherwise. Lower Bound (LB): Assigns the value 0 for any observation when the weekly observation is missing but there is at least one observation for this month. Upper Bound (UB): Assigns the value 1 for any observation when the weekly observation is missing but there is at least one observation for this month. Missing at random (MAR): Scale up the outcome variable by the missing weeks for the individual (assigns the average value observed for this person in this month when the weekly observation is missing). Note: All regressions in observational data are with household fixed effects and calendar month dummies with clustering at locality. All Experimental results are with one lag, month and clustering at locality. Robust standard errors in parentheses (0.071) (0.010) (0.715) (0.092) * Significant at the 10%; **significant at the 5%; *** significant at 1%. Weekly: This variable is equal to one if the data was collected weekly, and is zero otherwise. Log per capita expenditures: This value is the per capita total expenditure of the first year of observations. At least one acute was reported: This variable equals 1 if the individual reported at least one acute illness in the month, and is zero otherwise. Duration of Acute Illnesses: Total number of days with acute illnesses in the month. For monthly data this is equal to the maximum value between duration of the first acute and the second one. At least one self medication was taken: This variable is equal to one if the individual reported have taken at least one medicine by him/her self, and is zero otherwise. Sample size for individual observational regressions is 23669 and for household observational regressions it is 1094. Sample size for experimental individual regressions is 4528 and for household experimental household regressions is 205. All regressions in observational data are with individual fixed effects and calendar month dummies with clustering at the household level. All Experimental results are with one lag, month dummies and clustering at the household level. Robust standard errors in parentheses Note: This figure shows the non-parametric (lowess) relationship between health expenditure in the previous month and (log) percapita expenditures using monthly and weekly recall periods. We exclude the 5 percent of expenditure episodes exceeding Rs.1000 from the sample. The data on PCE are sparse beyond the indicated vertical line. main outcome variables used in the paper for the individuals who comprised the original ISERDD sample with those in the 205 households chosen for follow-up in the experimental study. The means of the outcome variables are presented for the individuals of the original ISERDD sample in the first year of observation. For the 205 households in the experimental study, we provide the means of the outcome variables in 2000, when they were first observed. Standard Errors are in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level of confidence.
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